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IN THE
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O
Record No. 2505
C. A. ASSAID
VS.
CITY OF ROANOKE
o
PETITION
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia-.
Your petitioner, C. A. Assaid, would respectfully show
unto your Honors that he is aggrieved by a certain final judg
ment entered by the Hustings Court of the City of Roanoke,
Virginia, on the 9th day of June, 1941, wherein that court ad
judged that he pay a fine in the sum of $50.00. A duly certified
transcript of the record is filed with this petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the June 1941, term of the Hustings Court for the City
of Roanoke, Virginia, your petitioner was tried in the Hustings
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Court for the City of Roanoke, Virginia, on a warrant
2* *charging him with having operated a pool room with
out a city license. C. A. Assaid had operated a pool room
in Roanoke City, on the date he was alleged to have operated
the pool room. It developed at the trial of the case that C. A.
Assaid had applied for, paid for and obtained a state license
to operate his pool room in the City of Roanoke, Virginia, said
state license having been issued to him in January, 1941, for the
license year 1941. It further developed that within the time in
which it was his duty to apply for a city license for the pool
room that he applied for, and offered to pay for, and tendered
a proper amount of money for, but could not obtain a city li
cense for his said pool room in the City of Roanoke, Virginia,
notwithsatnding the fact that he tendered the amount of the city
license provided for by the City License Code.
The Commissioner of the Revenue testified that he did
not issue a local license for the sole reason that the City Manager
had not approved the same. Assaid left the office of the Com
missioner of Revenue and went to the office of the City Man
ager, where he learned that the City Manager was away on a
hunting trip, and Assaid applied for approval for a city pool
room license to a clerk in the office of the City Manager, by the
name of Woodson, who had been delegated by the City Manager
to handle such matters. Mr. Woodson referred him to a sten
ographer in the office, who in turn referred him to the office of
the Chief of Police to whom she sent him with a slip on which
the Chief was to note his approval or his disapproval. The
Chief of Police did not approve the issuance of the license
3* to him, and he was sent back to Mr. Woodson, *who re
fused to recommend the license on behalf of the City
Manager. When the City Manager returned to the City of Roa
noke, the defendant again tendered the amount of the license fee
to the office of the Commissioner of Revenue, was again sent to
the City Manager's office, where he this time found the City
Manager, who refused to rescind the action of his clerk, and re
fused to give his consent for the issuance of the city license.
Assaid obtained the service of counsel, but the City Man
ager still withheld his permission for the defendant to get the
city license for which he was at all times ready, willing and able
to pay, and for which he was then and there tendering his mon
ey. When he had been finally refused a license and the licensing
authorities had refused to issue him a license and to accept his
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money in payment therefor, he decided to stand upon his rights
under the State Constitution, Federal Constitution and 14th
Amendment thereto.
He was later arrested for not having a city license, and plead
not guilty, and was tried in the Hustings Court and convicted
by the Judge, a jury having been waived, and all matters of law
and fact submitted to the court. The defendant testifying in his
own behalf said he had been ready at all times to pay for his
license up to the time of the offense alleged in the warrant, but
that the City of Roanoke would not accept his money or issue
him a license.
4* ^ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
o
I
The Court erred in adopting the contention of the Attor
ney for the Commonwealth, that the only relief which could
be afforded the defendant must be granted him in a court of
equity in a mandamus proceeding, and in failing to accord to
the accused an opportunity to rely upon his constitutional rights
once he had shown that he had tendered the money in the prop
er amount for the license, and in failing to allow the defendant
to assert his constitutional rights in the criminal action for after
all, the criminal action was quasi civil in that it was instituted
against the defendant for conducting a business without a li
cense fee payable to the City of Roanoke.
II
That the Ordinance under which he was convicted was void
in that the City Council for the City of Roanoke had no au
thority to prohibit the issuance of a pool room license, since all
of its authority must derive from acts of the Legislature, and
the authority given by the Legislature to the locality to charge
local license did not give the City authority to prohibit the is
suance of pool room licenses.
III
That the City Ordinance is void, for even if the City had
authority to prohibit pool rooms, it had no authority to pass an
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ordinance giving the City Manager authority to license one
person and refuse a license to another under the same or similar
conditions.
5*  *IV
That the City Ordinance was void for the reason that the
establishing of an authority in the City Manager without any
rules, or regulations, or tests, or standards by which he was to
be guided, was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority
to an administrative officer.
V
That the Ordinance was void in that it derived the defend
ant of his constitutional rights to conduct a legitimate business
which he had been licensed to conduct by the State; that the
same curtailed his right to pursue happiness through earning a
livelihood and violated the 14th amendment to the Constitution
of the United States in that it operated to deprive him of cer
tain rights allowed and permitted to others, and discriminated
against him.
VI
That the Court erred in allowing the City Manager and
others, over the objection of counsel, to state excuses for not
having issued the license without allowing cross examination to
develop that license had been issued to others under same and
similar conditions, and that arbitrary standards had been set
up and were followed, and in not allowing the defendant to
show the same by other and independent testimony for the
purpose of establishing the fact that the arbitrary power had
been arbitrarily administered to his detriment and thus he had
been deprived of his right guaranteed him by the 14th
6* amendment of the constitution of the United States.
ARGUMENT ON FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The manner and method providing for the enforcement
of an ordinance providing for license taxes must be consistent
with due process of law and constitutional rights may be as
serted in criminal cases, and a lawful tender of payment as well
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as actual payment of taxes deprives the tax gatherer of author
ity for further action to enforce payment and renders subse
quent steps on his part illegal and void. This was decided in
the case of William L. Royal v. Virginia, decided on an appeal
from the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in 1886, and
reported in 116 U. S. 272, 29 L. Ed. 735. The proceeding is
really one to enforce a civil debt.
ARGUMENT ON SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Defendant acquired his license under Section 195 of the
Tax Code, which is as follows:
"Pool and billiard rooms.—Any person who shall
keep a place wherein there is a table at which billiards or
pool are played shall be deemed to keep a billiard room,
and if any sum is imposed upon the tables kept therein the
same shall be on every table in excess of one capable of be
ing used for the purpose, and kept therein, whether used
or not. Any person who shall keep a billiard room with
out a license shall pay a fine of not less than fifty dollars
nor more than one hundred dollars for each day he may
continue to keep the same."
7* Every person who shall keep a billiard or pool room
shall pay for the privilege the sum of fifty dollars, and the
sum of twenty-five dollars for each table over one kept, or
to be kept therein. If the license be for a billiard or pool
room at a watering place, and is for four months or less,
the sum to be paid shall be twenty-five dollars, and the
sum of twelve dollars and fifty cents for each table over
one kept, or to be kept thereat. Licenses to keepers of bil
liard tables or pool tables at watering places may termin
ate on the thirty-first day of December, or at the end of
four months, which ever may happen first. If the license
be for a billiard or pool room in the country or in a town
of less than one thousand inhabitants, the sum to be paid
shall be twenty-five dollars, and twelve dollars and fifty
cents for each table over one kept, or to be kept, therein.
The word "billiard," as herein used, shall be construed to
include bagatelle. (Tax Bill, sees. 100, loi; 1910, p.
380; 1915, p. 232: Code 1919, sec. 2373.) "
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The right of a city to tax a business at all, and to regulate
the same is set out in Section 296 of the Tax Code, which is as
follows:
"City and town licenses.—In addition to the State
tax on any license, the council of a city or town may, when
anything for which a license is so required is to be done
within the city or town, impose a tax for the privilege of
doing the same, and require a license to be obtained there
for; and in any case in which they see fit, require from the
person licensed, bond, with sureties, in such penalty and
with such condition as they may deem proper, or make oth
er regulations concerning the same.
No city or town shall impose upon or collect from
any person any tax, fine, or other penalty for selling farm
or domestic products within the limits of any such town
or city outside of the regular market houses and sheds of
such city or town: provided, such products are grown or
produced by such person.
No city or town shall require a license to be obtained
for the privilege or right of printing or publishing any
newspaper. (Code 1919, sees. 3072, 3062.)"
8* *The law is tersely stated in 19 R. C. L., page 943, as
follows:
"The power of taxation is the power of a sovereign
state to require a contribution of money or other prop
erty in accordance with some reasonable rule of apportion
ment from the persons, property or occupations within its
jurisdiction for the purposes of defraying the public ex
penses. Such power lies exclusively in the legislature, and
a municipal corporation has no right to levy a tax upon
the property of its citizens without the sanction of a legis
lative enactment."
This fair statement of law is amply supported by numer-
our cases set out in foot note 6, on the same page.
"However, the power of boards and officials in res
pect of license requirements and impositions does not exist
in the absence of legislative authorization."
See 33 Am. Jur. 321, and Applewood v. Dosch, 329
Pa. 479, 86 A. 1070, Ann. Cas. igi4D, 481.. .
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From the above it must appear that if the City of Roanoke
taxes pool rooms at all, it must be pursuant to Section 296, and
it must be seen from a reading of the City Ordinance, that the
City in the same, has not attempted uniform regulations of pool
rooms but has attempted to destroy the usefulness of state li
censes by prohibiting people who have paid for the same from
using them in the City of Roanoke, thus nullifying the attempt
of the state to license pool rooms. "Regulation" and "prohibi
tion" are entirely different in their meanings.
The City License Ordinance is as follows:
"Billiard, Pool or Bagatelle Tables, (a) On each
person keeping a billiard saloon, or pool room . . . $50.00
and an additional tax of . . . $20.00, for each table, ex
ceeding one in such room capable of being used, whether
used or not. Not proratable.
(b) On each bagatelle, jenny ling, dexter table, in
door baseball or similar game or table . . . $100.00.
This license shall be a personal privilege and shall
9* granted and transferred only upon the order of the
City Manager.
No billiard saloon or pool room shall open for bus
iness until the license tax is paid. Any person, firm or cor
poration violating the provision of this section shall be
fined not less than $50.00 nor more than $100.00 for
each offense."
ARGUMENT ON THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The point seems to have been decided in favor of your
petitioner by this court in the case of Thompson v. Smith, re
ported in 154 S. E., page 579, 155 Va. 367. In that case the
Virginia court had this to say;
"It is a fundamental principle of our system of gov
ernment that the rights of men are to be determined by the
law itself, and not by the let or leave of administrative of
ficers or bureaus. This principle ought not to be surren
dered for convenience or in effect nullified for the sake of
expediency. It is the prerogative and function of the legis
lative branch of the government, whether state or munici
pal, to determine and declare what the law shall be, and
the legislative branch of the government may not divest it-
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self of this function or delegate it to executive or adminis
trative officers."
ARGUMENT ON FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
This principle also seems to have been recognized in the
case of Thompson v. Smith, supra, in the following language:
"That portion of the ordinance here in question which
authorizes the chief of police 'to revoke the permit of any
driver who, in his opinion, becomes unfit to drive an au
tomobile on the streets of the city', fails to declare the poli
cy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to con
trol the discretion of the chief of police in the revocation
of licenses in determining what constitutes unfitness to
drive an automobile on the streets of the city; and is void
because it delegates powers essentially legislative to an ad
ministrative officer."
10=^ * ARGUMENT ON FIFTH ASSIGNMENT
OF ERROR
This principle seems to have been recognized in the case
of Thompson v. Smith, supra. The court in that case makes
the following statement:
"The exercise of such a common right the city may,
under its police power, regulate in the interest of the pub
lic safety and welfare; but it may not arbitrarily or un
reasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one
to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifi
cations, under like conditions and circumstances to exer
cise it.'
In addition to the authority of Thompson v. Smith, we
quote in support of this contention Schechter v. United States,
a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, May
27, 1935. and reported in 97 A L. R., page 947, 295 U. S. 495,
79L. Ed. 1570, 55 Sap. Ct. Rep. 837. Therein it is said that:
"Legislative power is unconstitutionally delegated by
the provisions of an act failing to set up any standards
aside from the statement of the general aims of the act."
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See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, So L.
Ed. 760, 56 Sup. Ct. 855.
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. page 388: 79
L. Ed. 446, 55 Sup. Ct. 241, for other authorities
supporting this contention.
To the same effect that an ordinance may not arbitrarily
discriminate between persons engaged in the same occupation,
see ig R. C. L. page 957 and note and list of cases supporting
the text.
ARGUMENT ON SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The general rule is that arbitrary powers to grant or with
hold licenses cannot be conferred upon a board or officer.
II* See *33 Am. dur. page 377, and foot note of cases sup
porting the statement. See also note on page 378 of the
same work, in which a long list of cases are cited including the
case ofYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 I/. 5. 356, which has been fol
lowed by our Supreme Court of Appeals in the case of Thomp
son V. Smith, supra. On page 379 of 33 Am. Jur., this state
ment is made:
"The discretion conferred upon such a board or of
ficial, however, must be exercised within legal bounds.
These bounds are generally that the discretion must not
be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or fraudulently, or
without a factual basis sufficient to justify the action
taken."
This statement in the text is amply supported by the cases
in the foot notes.
"But even when the question is one of personal fit
ness, it has been held that the statute or ordinance should,
when practicable, prescribe a rule of action."
Replogle v. Little Rock, 166 Ark, 617, 267 S. W. 353.
IN 11 Am. Jur. page 937, is this statement:
"In exercising the powers delegated or conferred by
the legislature, the municipal corporation—or other local
subdivision—is subject to the same general principles con
cerning the delegation of powers as control the legislature
itself. Consequently, in exercising its power, a municipal-
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ity is subject to the same restrictions upon delegation of
legislative authority as rest upon the state legislature."
This statement seems to summarize the principles of the
decisions in the United States upon the subject.
The contentions that the ordinance violates the provis
ions of the 14th amendment to the Constitution, are fair-
12* ly stated in *Ency. of U. S. Sup. Ct. Reps. Vol. 4, at page
366, wherein it is said:
"It has been said that this is a government of laws
and not of men: that there is no arbitrary body of individ
uals; that the constitutional principles upon which our
government and its institutions rest do not leave room for
the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary pow
er, but that all in authority are guided and limited by those
provisions which the people have, through the organic law,
declared shall be the measure and scope of all control exer
cised over them. In particular, the fourteenth amendment,
and especially the equal protection clause thereof, forbids
that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary exer
cise of the powers of government; it was intended to pro
hibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life
or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property."
This statement of the law is amply supported by the cases
in the foot note, including the Yick Wo case hereinbefore cited.
Again, and at page 2,67, Ency. of U. S. Sup: Ct. Reps. Vol.
4 at page 367, the law is stated:
"In the first place, a law cannot be held unconstitu
tional because, while its just interpretation is consistent
with the constitution, it is unfaithfully administered by
those who are charged with its execution. Their doings
may be unlawful while the statute is valid. Again, the con
stitutionality of a statute ,justly and properly interpreted,
being conceded, neither prosecution nor findings, under a
mistaken construction and application, which, if correct,
would render it unconstitutional, will, of themselves, con
stitute a deprivation of property or a denial of the equal
protection of the laws, since if the conclusion of the ad
ministrative officers are erroneous, the courts are open for
the correction of the error."
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"Again, a statute or ordinance may be so framed that,
while perfectly fair and valid on its face, it is susceptible of
unfair and unequal administration. In such case, its en
forcement in an unequal and arbitrary manner for the pur
pose of oppressing any particular individual or class will
be relieved against by the courts. No presumption arises
13* *in such case, however, that the statute is, or will be, un
equally and oppressively administered even though it is
shown that it was directed against a particular class and
was designed for the purpose of enforcing an arbitrary and
unjust discrimination against that class. In other words,
it is not sufficient to show evil design, or the possibility
of evil under the statute, but it must be shown that in its
actual enforcement it is unequally and arbitrarily adminis
tered and used as an instrument of oppression against the
class against whom it was directed."
This statement seems amply supported by the foot notes
on the same page and following page, and in the case of Ah Sin
V. Whittman, 198 U. S. 500. At page 508 it will be seen that
such evidence offered on behalf of the defendant was not only
proper but that the defendant was under a duty to show the
same if he meant to rely upon his constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
In Ency. of U. S. Ct. Reps. Vol. 4, page 371, there is this state
ment amply supported by respected authorities:
"On the other hand, it is held that the law itself is
obnoxious to this provision, and unconstitutional, where,
although otherwise fair and impartial upon its face, it vests
a board of supervisors or other municipal body with an ab
solute and arbitrary discretion, without the right of appeal
therefrom, to grant or refuse a license for conducting a
legitimate business without regard to the character and fit
ness of the applicant or the suitableness of the place where
it is proposed to be conducted, thereby putting it within
the power of such board to make arbitrary and unjust dis
criminations founded on differences of race or color, or up
on any other arbitrary distinction, and where it is shown
that in the administration of the ordinance such discrimina
tions are actually made."
Again in the same work at page 373, there is this state
ment amply supported by authorities cited in the foot notes:
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"But while recognizing to the full extent the impos-
14* sibility of an imposition of duties and obligations *mathe-
matically equal upon all, and also recognizing the right
of classification of industries and occupations, we must
nevertheless always remember that the equal protection of
the laws is guaranteed, and that such equal protection is
denied when upon one of two parties engaged in the same
kind of business, and under the same conditions, burdens
are cast which are not cast upon the other."
"Acts done under a municipal ordinance passed un
der a power conferred by a state are within the contempla
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Con
stitution."
Home Tel. Co. etc. v. Los Angeles, 27 U. S. 278, 57 L.
Ed. 510, 33 Sup. Ct. 312.
Some times the best way to ascertain whether or not an
ordinance is arbitrary and unjust is to consider how the same
principle would apply to ones self at ones own profession. The
State of Virginia has provided an elaborate system for the li
censing of attorneys. Under the same section from which the
City of Roanoke claims authority to arbitrarily prohibit the li
censing of one individual, while granting a license to another,
the City Council might provide that the same City Manager for
Roanoke City could arbitrarily grant or withhold a license to
practice law, and to provide that practicing law in Roanoke City
without such a license would subject one to a fine or imprison
ment, by inserting in the section licensing attorneys, this same
provision:
"This license shall be a personal privilege, and shall
be granted and transferred only upon the order of the
City Manager."
One might then obtain a state license to practice law, which
would allow him to practice law anywhere in the state of Vir
ginia, except in Roanoke City. Upon attempting to prac-
15* tice in Roanoke, he might *be arbitrarily denied a city
license because the city manager did not like the color of
his eyes, or the silver in his hair, and if this is a proper exercise
of the municipal powers, the best jurist in the United States
could be prevented from practicing his profession in the magis
trates court of that city.
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The practice of law is a privilege, just as is the privilege of
running a pool room, but the fact that it is a privilege does not
give to the municipality the power to grant a license to one per
son equally qualified while refusing the same to another of the
same qualifications or to a third person of less qualifications.
CONCLUSION
Your petitioner most respectfully contends that the time
has not yet come in the United States when a dictator may sub
stitute his whim, judgment, wish or hunch for law and order,
and that until that time comes, the City of Roanoke is with
out constitutional authority to grant such domination over
United States subjects to W. P. Hunter, City Manager for Roa
noke City, his successor in office or anyone else.
He respectfully represents that he has a right to pursue an
honorable calling under the same laws as govern others in the
same business, and that the City Manager has no right to as
sume arbitrarily that he will abuse his license privilege granted
him by the State of Virginia, and now withheld from him by
the Hustings Court for the City of Roanoke, which has placed
him under a bond in the sum of $1000.00, which prohibits him
from operating a pool room while this case is pending.
16* *He respectfully submits that there is no proof that he
has ever forfeited his rights of citizenship and is not en
titled to all the privileges of a free citizen of the United States
and the State of Virginia. And he respectfully requests of this
court redress from the unjust discrimination which has been
practiced against him, and most respectfully requests that the
judgment of the Hustings Court be reviewed and reversed and
final judgment entered in this court discharging petitioner from
custody and further prosecution.
Your petitioner believes that even though he is a first
generation American, born of Syrian parents who came to this
country seeking liberties under the United States Constitution,
the City Manager of Roanoke should not be permitted or al
lowed to discriminate against him because of his racial origin,
and that any City Ordinance which permits the City Manager
to make such discrimination when he chooses, is repugnant to
the Constitution of Virginia, the Bill of Rights, the United
States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the same.
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and there can be no doubt that the Ordinance in question does
attempt to give such an arbitrary power to discriminate against
him because of his racial origin to an appointive administrative
officer of the City of Roanoke, Virginia.
Counsel for petitioner respectfully states that he desires to
orally present his reasons for reviewing the decision herein com
plained of and represents that on the 17th day of July, 1941,
he delivered to the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of
Roanoke, and the City Attorney for the City of Roanoke, a
true and correct copy of this petition.
17* * Notice is further given that this petition will be filed
with the Honorable Herbert B. Gregory, Justice of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia at Roanoke, Virginia,
Notice is further given that if the writ of error and super-
sedeas herein prayed for is awarded, petitioner will rely upon
this petition for his opening brief in this court.
Respectfully submitted,
C. A. ASSAID,
By WALTER H. SCOTT,
Counsel.
WALTER H. SCOTT,
Counsel for Petitioner.
I, Walter H. Scott, Attorney practicing in the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that there is error in
the judgment of the Hustings Court for the City of Roanoke,
Virginia, pronounced on the 9th day of June, 1941, herein com
plained of. and that the same should be reviewed and reversed.
Given under my hand this the 25th day of June, 1941.
WALTER H. SCOTT,
Of Roanoke, Virginia.
Received and filed before me this day—7-17-41.
H. B. G.
Writ of error and supersedeas awarded—Bond $300.00.
7-30-1941.
H. B. G.
Received July 31, 1941.
M. B. W.
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RECORD
page 2 ] VIRGINIA:
Pleas before the Honorable J. L. Almond, Jr., Judge
of the Hustings Court for the City of Roanoke, Virginia, on the
ninth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty one,
A. D. 1941.
City of Roanoke,
vs. CASE NO. 17439
C. A. Assaid, alias
C. E. Assaid, alias
Uric Assaid
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: on the 29th
day of May, 1941, the Civil and Police Justice for said City of
Roanoke, on the complaint and information on oath of Serge
ant Harvey and three other Police Officers, a criminal warrant
was issued for the arrest of C. A. Assaid, alias C. E. Assaid,
alias Uric Assaid, upon which warrant the defendant was ar
rested, tried and convicted.
Which conviction was by the defendant, C. A. Assaid, ac.,
appealed to the Hustinp Court for the said City of Roanoke,
Virginia, which said criminal warrant is in the words and fig
ures following, to-wit:
page 3 ] CRIMINAL WARRANT
CRIMINAL WARRANT
State of Virginia,
City of Roanoke, to-wit:
To all or any of the Police Officers of said City:
WHEREAS, Sgt. Harvey, H. A. Thomas, H. L. Britt, W.
B. Carter has this day made complaint and information on
oath, before me, the undersigned Civil and Police Justice of
said city, that C. A. Assaid alias C. E. Assaid (White) alias
Uric Assaid on or about the 14th day of March, 1941 at said
city, did unlawfully operate a billiard saloon or pool room with-
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W. B. Carter
out first obtaining a license so to do, contrary to Roanoke City
Ordinance.
These are, therefore, in the name of the COMMON
WEALTH OF VIRGINIA, to command you forthwith to ap
prehend and bring before me, the said Civil and Police Justice
of said city, the body of the said C. A. Assaid alias C. E. As-
said and Uric Assaid to answer said complaint and be further
dealt with according to law.
And, moreover, upon the arrest of the said by
virtue of this WARRANT, I command you in the name of the
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA to summon
to appear at the Police Court, as witness, to testify in behalf of
the COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, against the said
and have then and there this WARRANT, with
your return thereon.
Given under my hand and seal this 29th day of May, 1941.
H. S. BIRCHFIELD, Civil and J. P. (SEAL)
(ENDORSEMENT ON BACK)
The within-named C. A. alias C. E. Assaid alias Uric As-
said (White) was brought before me the 29th day of May,
1941, and on the evidence of Sgt. Harvey, H. A.
page 4 ] Thomas, H. L. Britt, W. B. Carter he is found guilty
of operating a billiard saloon or pool room without
first obtaining a license so to do, contrary to Roanoke City Code,
as charged in the within warrant and I do adjudge that he be
confined in the jail of the City of Roanoke for . . . . days and
pay a fine of $50.00 and $.50 costs.
H. S. BIRCHFIELD (C. & J. P)
page 5 ] EVIDENCE FOR THE CITY
Police Officer, W. B. CARTER—Sworn for the City.
By Mr. Smith:
Q. You are Police Officer W. B. Carter of the City of
Roanoke?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. About the 14th day of March this year, did you sum-
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mons this defendant up for operating a poolroom without a
license?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where is this poolroom located?
A. At 14I/2 Nelson Street, southeast.
Q. In the basement there?
A. Yes, sir, under the Ritz Hotel.
Q. Who was in charge there?
A. C. A. Assaid.
Q. You mean C. A. Assaid, the defendant here?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he claim to have a city license?
A. No, sir.
Q. Has he been operating since that time without it?
A. Yes, I have summoned him up since.
Q. That is in the City of Roanoke?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith:
Thats all.
page 6 ] By Mr. Scott:
I want to object to that testimony, and ask that it
be stricken from the record, because I don't think it has any
thing to do with this case.
By Mr. Smith;
Q. You are a police officer in the City of Roanoke, are
you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And as such you frequently go to this place?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It is a poolroom?
A. No, sir, I don't term it a poolroom.
Q. Do they have pool tables there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many do they have there?
A. I think there are two or three there.
By the Court:
Objection overruled.
By Mr. Scott:
I don't wish to ask Mr. Carter any questions at this time.
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as I have summoned him as my witness and will call him when
I put on my evidence.
Witness stands aside.
page 7 ] Officer H. L. BRITTS—Sworn for the City.
By Mr. Smith:
Q. You are police officer H. L. Britts?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Britts, on the 14th day of March this year, about
6:00 p. m., did you go with other officers to 14I/2 Nelson
Street in the City of Roankoe?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is being operated there? What kind of bus
iness? What is there?
A. They have some pool tables there, but I have never
seen anybody shooting pool. I have been there a number of
times.
Q. They had billiard tables there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who runs that place?
A. Mr. Uric Assaid.
Q. What is his right name, do you know?
A. I believe it is Charlie, but everybody calls him Uric;
that is all I know.
Mr. Smith:
Thats all.
CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. Scott:
Q. That place of business is conducted by Mr. C. A. As-
said, who is nicknamed Uric Assaid?
A. Yes, sir.
page 8 ] Q. At the time you went in there, you did not see
anyone shooting pool, but there are pool tables and
pool balls and everything prepared there to shoot pool. Is that
right?
A. Yes, they have pool tables in there, and balls.
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Q. And therefore this man is charged with conducting a
poolroom without a license?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you saw the poolroom tables and equipment
there?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott:
Thats all.
Witness stands aside,
page 9 ] Sergeant M. L. Harvey—Sworn for the City.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Smith:
Q. Are you Police Sergeant M. L. Harvey?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you familiar with the place in question here?
A. Yes, but I have only been in the place one time.
Q. Is it a poolroom?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith:
Thats all.
CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. Scott:
Q. You say you have been inside of the place once?
A. Yes, sir. I went in there one time.
Q. And that was to see if this man had a license?
A. I went in there to search the place for gambling.
Q. When was that?
A. If I am not mistaken it was the 9th of March.
Q. This year?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are there pool tables in there?
A. Yes, there are pool tables in there,
page 10 ] Q. And the man had a state license to conduct a
poolroom?
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A. He had a state license for a poolroom and a restaurant
license—he had a little counter back there, and there were four
or five cases of soft drinks there and a place to fix sandwiches.
You went through a door from the street down into a hall,
through another door, and back to a little door to the place, and
there were some seven or eight persons at the door and they
hollered some words when we went in.
Q. This man is charged with conducting a poolroom
without a city license, and he didn't have any at the time?
A. That right.
Mr. Scott:
Thats all.
Witness stands aside.
END OF ALL DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR THE CITY
page 11 ] EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
Major J. F. INGOLDSBY—Sworn for the defense.
By Mr. Scott:
Q. You are Superintendent of Police for the City of
Roanoke?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It is a fact, isn't it, that Mr. Assaid applied for a pool
room license, and came to your office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He offered to take out a license for a poolroom, did
he not?
A. I received an application from the City Manager's of
fice, that is a license for a poolroom.
Q. There is no question, then, but what an application
did come to your office from the City Manager's office for you
to approve or disapprove the granting of this license?
A. No, sir.
Q. And you didn't approve it?
A. No, sir.
Mr. Scott:
Thats all for the present.
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CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. Smith:
Q. Did you approve or recommend that?
A. The form that comes to my office has a provision on
it for approval.
Q. Did you approve it or recommend against it?
page 12 ] A. I recommended against it. I didn't approve it.
Q. And you sent it back to the City Manager?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith:
Thats all.
RE DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Scott:
Q. You made no recommendation other than filling in
the blanks approving or not approving it? Thats all you did?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I believe you just put on it "not approved" and sent
it back?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott:
Thats all. |
Witness stands aside.
page 13 ] C. A. ASSAID—Sworn for the defense.
By Mr. Scott:
Q. You are Mr. C. A. Assaid?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In January, the first week in January, when licenses
were obtainable, did you apply at the office of the Commis
sioner of Revenue for a City license and a state license to con
duct a poolroom, and then and there tender the proper amount
of money for a poolroom license, both city and state?
A. I did.
Q. Were you at the time given a license?
A. I was given a state but no city license.
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Q. Were you given to understand you had to go to the
City Manager's office in conneciton with your city license?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you go to the City Manager's office?
A. Yes, sir, but he was not in, and some fellow gave me
a slip of paper and told me to take it to the Chief of Police to
have him OK it. I took it down there, but he didn't OK it. Mr.
Hunter was out of town at the time.
Q. After Mr. Hunter got back, did you then make an
other attempt to get acity license and tender your money for it?
A. I did.
Q. Did you go to the Commissioner of Revenue's
page 14 ] office?
A. I did.
Q. Did they give you a piece of paper to take over across
the hall to get your license?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you do everything you could to get your license?
A. I did.
Q. You did, then, obtain a proper state license for con
ducting a poolroom in the city of Roanoke?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that state license for conducting a poolroom at
14J/2 Nelson Street?
(Mr. Smith, of counsel representing the City objec-
ed to that question on the ground that this case has to do
with operatnig without a city license, which objection
court overruled.)
(Witness made no audible answer to Mr. Scott's ques
tion.)
Q. Did you purchase a state license for conductnig this
particular poolroom with which you are charged with conduct
ing, pay therefor, and is that license for a poolroom at 14J/2
Nelson Street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And under that state license you have conducted your
poolroom?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you at all times been ready, willing and
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page 15 ] able, and anxious to pay this city license if some
body would sell it to you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you still willing to buy that license if someone
will accept it?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott:
Thats all.
CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. Smith:
Q. What is your full name?
A. Charles A. Assaid.
Q. What does the "A" stand for?
A. Alloysis.
Q. What nickname do you have?
A. Uric.
Q. And you have a brother named Joseph?
A. Thats right.
Q. Are you the operator of this place?
A. I am.
Q. And the state license is in what name?
A. C. A. Assaid.
Q. I believe the Superintendent of Police and the City
Manager informed you they would not approve the granting of
your city license by the Commissioner of Revenue?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On account of your criminal record?
page 16 ] (Defense counsel objected to the question—objec
tion overruled by the court)
A. They wouldn't give it to me.
Q. Were you, on June 15, 1940, convicted of operating
a gambling house and sentenced to serve six months—that was
at the beginning of last year—and again on June 15th last
year, was r. similar sentence given you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And for gambling, on the same date you received a
fine of $100 and 30 days?
A. Yes.
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Q. Those cases were not appealed, were they?
A. No, sir.
Q. I believe that on the 17th of June there were three or
four other warrants served on you, charging gambling, and op
erating a gambling house.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You never appealed those?
A. No, sir.
Q. That is all at the same place that you now claim to
have a state license for?
A. Thats right.
Q. I believe you were, in 1936, 1937 and 1938 convict
ed of gambling at various times, were you not?
A. No, sir. I have been convicted but once and paid
$5.00—
Q. Was that in September of 1937; or do you re-
page 17 ] call?
A. The $5.00 fine, I recall that, but I don't re
member what year. That is the first time since 1934.
Mr. Smith:
Thats all.
RE DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Scott:
Q. Mr. Assaid, Mr. Smith has asked you about a par
ticular offense on which you were convicted last year. I believe
there were six charges against you. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact that three of those offenses were in con
nection with the holding of bets, as an accessory, in which cases
the principal was acquitted in the Hustings Court because the
Judge of the court held that the ordinance was not broad enough
to convict them of betting "at" games, they not being at the
contest upon which the wager was made?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who is that principal?
(Mr. Smith objected to the question, and was sustain
ed by the court.)
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Q. You were convicted of a charge or two?
A. Yes, sir. I was convicted of a couple of charges.
Q. You didn't appeal your case?
A. No, sir.
Q. You went to the state farm and served your time and
paid your fine?
A. I did.
Q. Mr. Assaid, was your 1940 poolroom license ever
revoked?
page 18 ] A. No, sir. I paid part on my license after I
came back.
Q. You paid part of your 1940 license after you came
back?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you conducting a poolroom at this location—as
of the date of this alleged offense?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Except for those matters that you were convicted on,
as far back as 1934 you have no recollection of anything ex
cept a $5.00 fine for a crap game. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
RE CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. Smith:
Q. You have been operating since March 8th, haven't
you?
(Defense counsel objected to the question, but was
overruled by the court)
Q. You are still operating down there now—down at
this address, open for business today?
A. I am not open now—I am here.
Q. You never have gotten a city license?
A. No, sir, I have not.
Mr. Smith:
Thats all.
Witness stands aside.
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page 19 ] Judge JOHN M. HART—Sworn for the defense.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Scott:
Q. I believe you are Commissioner of Revenue for the
City of Roanoke, State of Virginia?
A. I am.
Q. Did Mr. C. A. Assaid apply to you for a 1941 pool
room license?
A. He applied to Mr. Lescure.
Q. But the matter came to your attention?
A. He brought it to my attention. I saw him outside
there trying to get a license.
Q. You knew he did offer to get a city license?
A. Yes, he offered to get it. Before long I told him we
would not give it to him.
Q. And he also offered to get a state license?
A. Yes. I believe he got a state license.
Q. Do you have your records there?
A. The state license was—I know he got a state license.
Q. Did he on more than one occasion attempt to get a
city license?
A. I saw him there twice.
Q. Was that the first week in January, 1941, or some
where about that time?
A. Let me see—what is the name of this place?
page 20 ] Q. The Ritz Poolroom.
A. (consulting records before him) State License
was granted on the 3 ist of January.
Q. He had offered to take a city license prior to that time?
A. Yes, sir. He had offered to take both licenses, and
we had declined to give it to him. Mr. Lescure, I believe, told
him I would not give it unless the City Manager OK'd it, and
he asked me if I would give him a state license, and I said I
would.
Q. Do you have before you a record of other poolrooms
that were granted license in the City of Roanoke?
(Mr. Smith objected to the question, and was sus
tained by the Court)
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By Mr. Scott:
Your Honor, I objected to the Commonwealth's Attorney
going into this man's criminal record—I suppose that is the
reason the City Manager withheld the city license from him. If
that is so, it is perfectly proper to prove he granted licenses at
other places for poolrooms that were far worse than Assaid's
—exercising his power arbitrarily.
(The Court reiterated the sustaining of Mr. Smith's
objection)
By the Court:
The question for determination is what happened in this
case. It would be both impractical and impossible
page 21 ] to investigate every instance of the refusal or the
granting of a poolroom license. It would involve
the determination of numerous collateral and irrelevant issues.
If the City Manager gave his approval in an instance when he
should have withheld it or withheld his approval when he should
have given it, that would afford no criterion by which this case
should be measured and decided.
By Mr. Scott:
Your Honor, I am prepared to prove here that in several
instances that licenses were granted to people with gambling
records—the same thing this man was accused of, and cases of
actual sales of liquor in places of business over a period of years;
poolroom licenses granted in places where people were even con
victed of selling liquor and for other things; and I can show that
in at least one instance a license was issued to a nonexistent and
ficticious person in a place where people have been convicted of
gambling on numerous occasions. I vouch for the fact that I
can show that. May I, for the purpose of making up my rec
ord, show the granting of licenses for those places?
(The Court still sustained Mr. Smith's original ob
jection)
By Mr. Scott:
I want to except to your Honor's ruling for the rea-
page 22 ] son that I think it would not only show that arbi
trary powers were exercised but that the powers have
been arbitrarily administered and with no uniform method of
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administering them, and I can prove that other places have been
granted licenses where people have been involved with the law
on numerous occasions.
Witness stands aside.
page 23 ] W. B. CARTER—recalled by defense.
By Mr. Scott:
Your Honor has ruled it improper, but for the purpose of
making up my record, I want to ask Mr. Carter this question:
Q. Mr. Carter, as a police officer for the City of Roanoke
and, as such, are acquainted with poolrooms in the City of Roa
noke, Virginia, I want to ask you if it is not a fact that pool
room licenses were granted for the operation of a poolroom in
the upstairs of the Bear Building and known as Thomas* Place:
upstairs in the building known as the Horton Building occupi
ed at the time by the Uncas Club; a poolroom license for a place
known as Bartlett's Place, all in the City of Roanoke; and also
for one on South Jefferson Street near the railroad known as
Kokomo Muncie's place, or Wheby's?
By Mr. Smith:
I object to that. The Court has already ruled on that.
By the Court:
Objection sustained.
Br. Mr. Scott:
I ask this question for the purpose of showing that a pool
room license was granted for the manager of the Uncas Club in
the name of a ficticious person. I am simply trying to show
that there has been an arbitrary power arbitrarily exercised;
that there have been licenses granted to one person and with
held from another under the same conditions.
By the Court:
I am ruling against you.
page 24 ] W. P. HUNTER—Sworn for the defense.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Scott:
Q You are City Manager for the City of Roanoke?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Hunter, did Mr. C. A. Assaid make application to
your office for a poolroom license?
A. On January 2nd C. A. Assaid made application for a
poolroom license for 14Y2 Nelson Street, east.
Q. Did he make that application to your Mr. Woodson,
the young man who is now in the military service?
A. Yes, sir
Q. You were not in your office at the time?
A. I don't know whether I was in the office that day or
not—the day the application was made. The application was
made in Mr. Woodson's office and sent down to Major Ingolds-
by for the police record.
Q. Mr. Hunter, do all applications for local poolroom
licenses come to your office?
A. Yes, sir—that is, city licenses. The application comes
to my office.
Q. And the application, if approved, is then taken to the
Commissioner of Revenue.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have your slips showing that he did apply
there on the 2nd of January for the license?
page 25 ] A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you read to the court what you wrote the
Superintendent of Police, please sir.
A. Do you want the whole thing read?
Q. Yes, sir
A. This is dated Roanoke, Virginia, January 2nd, and
addressed to Major Ingoldsby: (reading)
"Dear Sir:
C. A. (Uric) Assaid has made application to this office for
the operation of a poolroom at 14J/2 Nelson Avenue, S. E.
Please investigate and if satisfactory return this application to
my office."
It is signed "H. L. Woodson, Jr." under my name. This came
back from Major Ingoldsby not approved.
Q Just read what you had on there for him, about ap
proval.
A. He wrote the word "not" in there.
Q. Does he say anything about why it was not approved?
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
W. P. Hunter
A. It says "not approved", then on the back of this is a
record of convictions, and there are eight convictions in 1940.
Q. Are they the convictions Mr. Smith asked about, grow
ing out of some raids?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then you didn't approve the application?
A. No, sir, I didn't approve it.
Q. Although he applied for it and offered to pay for
it?
page 26 ] A. He applied to my office, and I didn't approve
it.
Q. Mr. Woodson is not in Roanoke now, is he?
A. No.
Q. As I understood it, you detailed these poolroom li
censes to Mr. Woodson, who was your assistant in your office?
A. He was delegated to make application to the Superin
tendent of Police, who checks the record and it comes back to
me for final approval.
Q. Are not you mistaken about that Mr. Hunter, and
were not licenses issued in the first week in January when you
were not there?
A. I was here, Mr. Scott. I think I was out of town
one day.
Q. But there were licenses approved by Mr. Woodson?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Without your approval?
A. Yes, sir, when there is no police record.
Q. That was done by your assistant?
A. When there is no police record.
Q. Now, Mr. Hunter, did you make any inquiry other
than to search the police record in the name of Assaid?
A. Did I make any other check of it?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I read the daily report of Cundiff's detectives
page 27 ] at the time they were making investigations in Roa
noke.
Q. Mr. Hunter, if a person applied for a poolroom li
cense in a fictitious name, and that were sent to the police de
partment, the approval which came back, of course would not
show the true status of the place for which the license was ap
plied, would it?
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A. Thats right .
Mr. Smith:
I object to that question.
(No audible word from the Court)
Mr. Scott (continuing) :
Q. And if the operators of poolrooms where unlawful
acts have been committed, if they applied for a license in the
name of some third party with no police record, then the slip
would come back from the police department with no con
victions against that person and application would be auto
matically approved. Isn't that right?
A. If the party making the application had no police
record.
Q. Well now, Mr. Hunter, were not a number of licenses
approved by your office for places which—
Mr. Smith:
I object to that.
Mr. Scott: (continuing)
—for places where gambling was permitted and liquor sold,
simply by the expedient of applying for the license in the name
of a third party ?
page 28 ] By Mr. Smith:
I object to that.
By the Court:
Objection sustained.
Mr. Scott:
I want to except to the court's ruling for the reasons here
inbefore stated in excepting to the same ruling while the Com
missioner of Revenue was on the stand, because I feel reasonably
certain that I can prove that licenses were issued in at least two
places with bad records simply by the expedient of applying in
some other name, and those places are now licensed poolrooms
in the City of Roanoke, and they have police records far worse
than Assaid's; that the granting of those licenses is an arbitrary
sort of thing and no real check is made to ascertain even if there
are such persons.
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Mr. Scott:
Thats all.
CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. C. E. Hunter:
Q. What was Mr. Woodson's capacity—in what capaci
ty did he work in your office?
A. He was Assistant to the City Manager.
Q. And he had offices adjoining yours?
A. Yes.
Q. And he assisted you in matters pertaining to city man
agement?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You spoke of the report, the daily report received
when you went over the record of convictions in the
page 29 ] different investigations—
Mr. Scott:
I object to that. I believe he stated that last summer he
read the daily report, Mr. Hunter.
A. That was the daily report made by the Detective Agen
cy of the operations here in Roanoke.
By Mr. Hunter: (continuing)
Q. Did the report relate to this in any way?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Scott asked you if you had not often given au
thority to another to revoke licenses or disapprove licenses.
Was this action your action, or somebody else's?
A. This is my action. This is on the back of the appli
cation for the license: in the exercise of my judgment.
By Mr. Scott:
Q. If it had not first been rejected by Mr. Woodson,
it would never have come to you. Is that correct?
A. Mr. Woodson would not approve an application for
license not approved by Major Ingoldsby.
Q. If Major Ingoldsby recommended them, then Mr.
Woodson issued them.
A. If they had a police record, he would not issue them.
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Q. Then, Major Ingoldsby would not recommend them
if they had a police record. Is that correct?
A. That is correct,
page 30 ] Q. If Major Ingoldsby didn't refuse it, then Mr.
Woodson granted it?
A. Y es.
Q. If Mr. Woodson refused it, then the matter came to
you for your attention. That is the procedure, isn't it?
A. If it came back with a police record not approved by
Major Ingoldsby, it was not issued.
Q. The young lady in your office, as well as Mr. Wood-
son, handled a number of these matters?
A. She just made the application on a typewriter, thats
all, and told the man where to go.
Q. Told him to go down to Major Ingoldsby's office?
A. Yes, sir, for the police record.
Q. How long had Major Ingoldsby been in Roanoke in
January when you sent these applications down there?
A. I think he came here—I think it was the 15th or i6th
of September.
Q. When did he begin his actual duties?
A. I think it was the 16th of September, without check
ing the record.
Q. Major Ingoldsby is the Chief of Police in the City of
Roanoke?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Hunter, did you issue any licenses which
page 31 ] Major Ingoldsby did not approve?
Mr. Smith:
I object to that.
A. One, yes, sir.
The Court:
Objection sustained.
By Mr. Scott:
I except to the ruling of the Court. He had already ans
wered the question.
Witness stands aside.
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page 32 ] By Mr. Scott:
If your Honor please, I think it is elementary that
unless a criminal intends to violate a valid law, there can be no
valid conviction. In this case, it is our purpose to show that
there is no intent on the part of this man to violate the law; but
his intention was to comply with the law, and I believe it has
been shown he did all he could to comply with the law.
I take the second position that that part of the ordinance
which gives the City Manager arbitrary power, and outlining no
methods of carrying it out, is invalid. I base that upon Virginia
cases decided by our Court of Appeals, and upon the Constitu
tion of Virginia. I think we might well begin with Section i of
the Constitution of this state, which is as follows—and I am
reading from the case of Taylor v. Smith, 124 S. E., page 263:
"That all men are by nature equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent rights, of which when they enter into a
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, depirve or divest
their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety."
Now, no longer quoting from the Constitution, but quoting
from that case in the ensuing paragraph:
"They embrace all businesses that are legitimate in charac
ter, and are of such nature as to indicate that they are inherent
in the individual claiming them."
Now the Taylor case made a distinction where the city might
grant a City Manager or Chief of Police an arbitrary
page 3 3 ] authority which might be used in an arbitrary man
ner in matters under which there were no constitut
ional guarantees as at present. In any case, the city had a right
to withhold from anyone the right to conduct business as a pub
lic carrier in the streets Of course, having the right in that case
to arbitrarily deny that privilege of operating as a common
carrier in the streets, gave them the right to arbitrarily say who
might do it, and arbitrarily give to one and disapprove of an
other. The disstinction between these two cases, and in favor
of the defendant here this morning, is well drawn in the case
of Thompson v. Smith, which reviews—which cited the Tay
lor case—154 S. E. at page 579. In that case the Chief of Po
lice undertook to arbitrarily deprive a man of his driving permit
because a city ordinance allowed him, whenever in his opinion it
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should be done, to deprive someone of his driving permit. Al
though, as stated in the Taylor case, they might exercise arbi
trary discretion in denying anyone the right to conduct his bus
iness in the public streets, or on public property, or make use of
public property, that is not the issue in this case. The law is
different when a man wants to exercise one of his constitutional
rights. In this instant case, we do not have a man applying for
the privilege of conducting a poolroom in a city owned building
or upon a city street, or to make use of any city property, or at
any place where the city could arbitrarily grant or
page 34 ] withhold it. We have here the case of a man ap
plying for license for the conduct of a poolroom bus
iness. The Court, in this Thompson case, had this to say:
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways
and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of
life and business is a common right which he has under his right
to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and
to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so do
ing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and
under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a
horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an auto
mobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and
business. It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of mov
ing a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street,
or transporting persons or property for hire along the street,
which a city may permit or prohibit at will.
The exercise of such a common right the city may, under
its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and
welfare; but it may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or
restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to per
mit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and cir
cumstances, to exercise it."
Now in this case, there is no set of rules laid down for the guid
ance of the City Manager except his own discretion and his dele
gation of legislative authority, without the necessary safeguard
which the law would require to insure that it could not be grant
ed to one and withheld from another under like circumstances.
Our Virginia court says this:
"It is a fundamental principle of our system of govern
ment that the rights of men are to be determined by the law it
self, and not by the let or leave of administrative
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page 35 ] officers or bureaus. This principle ought not to be
surrendered for convenience or in effect nullified for
the sake or expediency. It is the.prerogative and function of the
legislative branch of the government, whether state or municipal,
to determine and declare what the law shall be, and the legislative
branch of the government may not divest itself of this function
or delegate it to executive or administrative officers."
"This does not mean, however, that no discretion can be
left to administrative officers in administering the law. Govern
ment could not be efficiently carried on if something could not
be left to the judgment and discretion of administrative officers
to accomplish in detail what is authorized or required by law in
general terms. Without this power legislation would become
either oppressive or inefficient. There would be confusion in
the laws, and, in an effort to detail and particularize, the law
would miss sufficiency both in provision and detail."
* * * "The majority of the cases lay down the rule that
statutes or ordinances vesting discretion in administrative of
ficers and bureaus must lay down rules and tests to guide and
control them in the exercise of the discretion granted in order to
be valid:"
Now, there is no question, I think, about the defendant's right
to have a poolroom license. The Tax Code of the State of Vir
ginia, Section 296, specifically gives him that right if he pays
that tax any time same may be accepted. The City takes the
view that under this Tax Code they have the right to arbitrarily
withhold licenses, as shown in the trial of this case when it was
before Judge Birchfield and came up here on appeal. We do not
contend that the City should not make reasonable
page 3 6 ] rules and regulations for the licensing of poolrooms
or for not licensing poolrooms, where they may
be conducted or may not be conducted, provided there is uni
formity in such rules and regulations; but I do contend that they
have no right to prohibit the operation of a poolroom at all when
the man has paid his state license for that recognized privilege.
Section 296 of the State Code reads:
"In addition to the State tax on any license, the council of
a city or town may, when anything for which a license is so re
quired is to be done within the city or town, impose a tax for
the privilege of doing the same, and require a license to be ob
tained therefor: and in any case in which they see fit, require
from the person licensed, bond, with sureties, in such penalty and
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with such conditions as they may deem proper, or make other
regulations concerning the same."
You will notice there is no power given whatsoever to prohibit,
but it says "or make other regulations concerning the same."
Your Honor knows there is a difference between regulations
made to live up to and trying to prohibit something. In im
posing regulations, you assume operation of something: in pro
hibiting something, there is nothing to restrict and nothing to
supervise. It is therefore our contention that this arbitrary pow
er is void, that that part of the ordinance is void, and that the
City Manager should not have been vested by the City Council
with such arbitrary power, and our opinion is based upon de
cisions in previous Virginia cases. It is right hard to arrive at a
rule of uniformity for the whole country, and for that reason I
have attempted in this argument this morning to take some cases
here in our own state. The Commonwealth relies upon a case
that went up from Norfolk. In that case there was
page 37 ] an ordinance that compelled people to move along
the streets and not loiter, and they cite that as having
some application to this case. I have been unable to see it, be
cause there the ordinance was uniform, and the only question in
the case was the question of guilty or not guilty, which was left
to the court and not delegated to any one person..
Therefore, the only cases I can find on the point are the
Taylor and the Smith case, with the Smith case specifically say
ing to grant a person arbitrary power is void and an uncon
stitutional delegation. I may say that I have a little brief that I
prepared for the court downstairs which I will be glad to sub
mit showing authorities.
By Mr. Smith:
To straighten out the record and in order not to have any
misleading statements in there, I would like the opportunity to
vouch the record that one of the men named by Mr. Scott as op
erating a poolroom claims he never ran a poolroom. Also, it
was brought out by the defendant's witnesses that Mr. Hunter
had referred to the reports of an investigation made here last
year, and I reserve the right to put in the record that portion of
those reports which had to do with that particular place.
By Mr. Scott:
I object to that, your Honor. The record shows that when
I asked Mr. Carter about Mr. Bartlett's place, I did not aver that
I could'show he had operated a poolroom.
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page 38 ] By C. E. Hunter (City Attorney) :
May it please the Court, in reply to the learned coun
sel for the defendant, who has seen fit to quote Section i of the
Constitution of the State of Virginia set forth in the case of Tay
lor V. Smith, it will be observed that after quoting the language
of the Constitution, which is as follows:
"That all men are by nature equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter in
to a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or
divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pur
suing and obtaining happiness and safety"
—that means, of course, it is rights in common that are inherent.
If the contention of Mr. Scott is true, then the legislature could
not prohibit a man from operating a bar room in the old days—
when the operator of a barroom applied for a license, he could
not get it until the court passed upon his fitness; if that is true and
the legislature had provided for licenses for barrooms, then any
body could come in and say "Here is my money for license for
a barroom, and nobody cannot say whether or not I can op
erate it, because it is my inherent right." The Court of Appeals,
after quoting that statement from the Constitution, said this:
"They embrace all businesses that are legitimate in charac
ter, and are of such nature as to indicate that they are inherent
in the individual claiming them."
It has never been considered that it is inherent in any
page 39 ] individual to operate businesses such as barrooms,
for instance. In some of the states there are provis
ions whereby houses of ill fame can be conducted, provided cer
tain restrictions are imposed and providing regulations of law,
etc. are met with. It is not an inherent right to operate bus
inesses such as those. This case of Tylor v. Smith, dealt with
a business that anybody could operate. The other case cited by
Mr. Scott, Thompson v. Smith—that is nothing except the revo
cation of a license to use the highways. Of course it is the in
herent right of any individual to use the highways of the state,
which is also another proposition.
Now we come to our view of the case. The defendant
claims that the ordinance does not set up any standard for the
pidance of the City Manager. The City contends it would be
impractical to set up definite standards as to who is a proper
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person to operate a poolroom, or who is a proper person to op
erate a barroom or house of ill fame, if there is such red light
district operated by permission of the law provided certain regu
lations are met. The case of Benson v. City of Norfolk, 163 Va.
1037, dealt with that proposition, and quotes this from another
case:
We are of the opinion that a city may, in the execution
of its police power, invest its administrative and executive of
ficers with a reasonable discretion in the performance of duties
devolved upon them to that end, whenever it is necessary for the
safety and welfare of the public. Such a discretion is neither
arbitrary nor capricious."
page 40 ] The Court also quoted this from a note in 12 A. L.
R., 1435:
"It is also well settled that it is not always necessary that
statutes and ordinances prescribe a specific rule of action, but, on
the other hand, some situations require the vesting of some dis
cretion in public officials, as, for instance, where it is difficult or
impracticable to lay down a definite, comprehensive rule, or the
discretion relates to the administration of a police regulation and
is necessary to protect the public morals, health, safety, and gen
eral welfare."
In the decision of the Supreme Court in this case, which is a
later case than the ones cited by Mr. Scott, the court says this:
"It is, in our opinion, most salutary that the police officers
of a municipality should have reasonable authority and discre
tion. Indeed, in exegencies, it is vital to the welfare of the com
munity."
Now, there are two excellent notes on this found in 12 A. L. R.,
1447 and 54 A. L. R. 1110. The operation of a poolroom is
more a matter of privilege, because it is of a character different
from the ordinary lines of business,—I am just giving you the
gist of those notes,—^just as dealing in intoxicating liquors is
generally considered as a business that may be wholly forbidden,
and that a license to engage in the traffic of liquors is a privilege
merely, revocable at the will of the supervisor granting power.
In 12 A. L. R., 1453, there are two cases dealing with arbitrary
discretion in connection with poolrooms, or what was claimed
to be arbitrary discretion. The first of these cases is State v.
Sherow, 123 Pac. 866, which is a Kansas case, and the other one
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is Devereaux v. Genessee County, 177 N. W. 967, which is a
Michigan case. The arbitrary and uncontrolled dis-
page 41 ] cretion was upheld in the first case and denied in
the latter case, showing that the courts, as to pool
rooms, are divided. There is a statute in the State of Virginia
showing that poolrooms are in the category such as barrooms
in Virginia. Poolrooms are not considered ordinary places of
business, as evidenced by Code section 4697a, whereby minors
are not permitted to go therein except in incorporated cites and
towns. Vice control demands that some responsible officer
should be vested with discretion regarding the operator of a
poolroom. Now, why is it that minors are not permitted to go
in poolrooms except in incorporated cites and towns? It is be
cause there is a better bridle on those permitted to operate the
poolrooms. Cities and towns are able to pass ordinances such as
were passed here, giving somebody the authority to supervise.
In fact the legislature said they are in the same category as bar
rooms, so that that business does not come within those bus
inesses contemplated by Section i of the Constitution and it is
not a business in which there is an inherent right of somebody
to operate, because they cannot walk into the Commissioner of
Revenue's office and say "here is my fee" and get the license.
In the case of Thompson v. Smith, that case deals with the right
of a citizen to travel upon the public highways, a common right
enjoyed by all persons, not such as selling intoxicating liquor or
operating a poolroom. Courts assume that officials will exer
cise their discretion in a fair and reasonable way.
From the facts in this case, it would appear that the
page 42 ] City Manager has not abused his discretion in deny
ing the defendant a license for a poolroom. What
did he do? He made an investigation first. Mr. Scott treated
this paper shown here as the defendant's application. It was
not the defendant's application. He came in here and applied in
person for on OK for his license. This piece of paper was not
filled out by him: it showed that this man had applied for a li
cense, which was referred to the Police Department. What is
this man's police record? Is there any crime or reason why the
City Manager should not ask for a recommendation—that is
what it amounted to—from the Police Department? The City
Manager said that after receiving this police record and after re
ceiving a recommendation from the Chief of Police of this City,
it was his judgment that this man should not be granted a li
cense to operate a poolroom. The defendant claims that be-
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cause he obtained a state license, he has purchased the right to
operate a poolroom in the City of Roanoke. The Tax Code,
Sec. 296, says * * * and with such condition as they may deem
proper, or make other regulations concerning the same." What
was the condition here? The condition was that he had to first
obtain the approval of the City Manager before such a license
was granted.
By Mr. Scott:
If your Honor please, if Mr. Hunter thinks that our con
tention is that the city has no right whatsoever to regulate pool
rooms, that is not the issue. Our contention is that they have
no right to refuse a license for a poolroom, to one person and
grant one to another although we freely admit they
page 43 ] have every right to regulate that matter, as given
them by the state law. Mr. Hunter intimated I
should have read a little further in the Taylor v. Smith case.
It is true I didn't read all that next paragraph, but I will just
read that, because I think it is very important:
"The right of dominion over one's own property, to use
it as he sees fit so long as the rights of others are not infringed
upon, is a right which not even the legislative power of the state
can take from the individual. With respect to such proprietary
interests the extent of the state's power is that of regulation, and
such regulation must be of a kind that operates impartially and
alike upon all persons similarly situated. Regulation in matters
of this kind can never extend to the point of bestowing upon
any official or officials the power to permit or deny, according as
whim, fancy or favoritism may suggest, the enjoyment of the
right by the individual. The equal protection of the laws guar
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States denounces all attempts to subject the property
rights of individuals to the unrestrained discretion or control of
administering officials, except in those special instances where the
police power of the state may within the appropriate field re
served to it interpose its restraining arm."
Mr. Hunter said that because the poolroom business is regulated
by state statute it is in the category with barrooms. Barrooms
have been recognized as in a category by themselves from the
time of the creation of this republic and of this commonwealth,
and poolrooms have never been in that category. The mere fact
that they lay down regulations to control a business does not
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mean it is illegal. I might say, talking about driving permits,
that the state law provides that a person must have
page 44 ] a driving permit before he can drive a car. But,
simply because the state requires a man to get a driv
ing permit does not mean that someone in the City can come
along and take away that driving permit and do it arbitrarily.
That would be right in the face of what the court has held to
be the law. You may. under certain conditions I know, with
hold that man's driving permit: but that is another thing. Or,
they may say you must exercise certain restrictions; that is a
matter of regulation. Lets just take his argument, for instance,
in connection with the practice of law. We have a most elabo
rate system provided as to who may or may not practice law.
According to his argument, if you tax an attorney $50.00 for a
license, Mr. Hunter could arbitrarily withhold that license from
any individual he chose to who may want to practice law in the
City of Roanoke, Virginia. He could practice anywhere else,
but he could not practice in this city. Mr. Hunter argues that
that arbitrary manner is right and it is the law. That is cer
tainly not what our Court of Appeals said the law is.
Mr. Hunter talked about the state policy towards pool
rooms. Lets see what the state policy towards poolrooms is.
"Every person who shall keep a billiard or poolroom shall pay
for the privilege the sum of fifty dollars, and the sum of twen
ty-five dollars for each table over one kept, or to be kept there
in." This man has done that; he has done what the state said
you must do; if you conduct a poolroom you must be subject
to the laws laid down, such as minors are not to be
page 45 ] allowed in there, and you are subject to such rea
sonable regulations as the city may care to make.
But, the city should provide uniform regulations which do not
grant one the privilege and deny it to another similarly situated
or in similar circumstances. The whole question boiled down is
this: Is this an arbitrary exercise of power? By its own langu
age it is an arbitrary exercise of power! Whether it is being so
exercised does not matter. If it is his prerogative to exercise an
arbitrary power, then that provision is illegal and void, and this
man's license to conduct a poolroom in Roanoke City should be
granted him, subject to the right of the City to make such regu
lations as they care to make.
By Mr. Smith:
The defendant has admitted he operates a poolroom in the
City of Roanoke and has no city license. Thats all there is to it.
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There is no way to attack the City Manager's right to refuse to
grant him a license. The point I want to make is this: The
remedy that both the attorneys associated with me know and I
know, and the attorney for the defendant should know that the
proper way to get at this is through mandamus. The record
shows that he has been operating since March 18th down to this
good day absolutely without a city license, and I ask the court to
enter a $50.00 fine against him.
END OF ALL EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS
By the Court:
Judgment of the lower court affirmed.
page 46 ] (Counsel for the defendant excepted to the ruling
of the court and stated his reasons, and moved the
court to fix bond for an appeal, whereupon the court fixed bond
for $1,000.00)
FINIS
page 47 ] Section 28 of An Ordinance Imposing Licenses for
period from January ist to December 31st for the
City of Roanoke—1936.
"BILLARD, POOL OR BAGATELLE TABLES.
(a) on each person keeping a billiard saloon, or pool
room $50.00
and an additional tax of $20.00
for each table, exceeding one in such room capable of
being used, whether used or not. Not proratable.
(b) On each bagatelle, jenny lind, dexter table, in
door baseball or similar game or table $100.00.
This license shall be a personal privilege and shall be grant
ed and transferred only upon the order of the City Manager.
No billiard saloon or poolroom shall open for business un
til the license tax is paid. Any person, firm or corporation vio
lating the provision of this section shall be fined not less than
$50.00 nor more than $100.00 for each offense.
page 48 ] COPY OF SECTION 174 of An Ordinance Im
posing Licenses for period from January ist to De
cember 31st for The City of Roanoke, Virginia.
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"Revoking of License. All licenses granted under this ordi
nance are granted upon the condition that the person, firm or
corporation conducting the business for which the license tax is
paid will not violate any of the ordinances of the City of Roa-
noke or any of the laws of the State of Virginia or of the United
States appertaining to gambling or having in his possession or
selling intoxicating liquors, and in the event of any such viola
tion of said ordinances or laws, and upon conviction thereof,
the City Manager shall have the power to revoke the same."
page 49 ] I, J. Lindsay Almond, Junior, Judge of the Hust
ings Court for the City of Roanoke, Virginia, do
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct stenograph
ic copy or report of all the testimony that was introduced, and
other incidents of the trial therein, including all the instruc
tions given, amended or refused, all exhibits or other writings in
troduced in evidence or presented to the trial court, all questions
raised and all rulings thereon in the case of the City of Roanoke
vs. C. A. Assaid alias C. E. Assaid alias Uric Assaid tried in the
Hustings Court for the City of Roanoke, Virginia, on the 9th
day of June, 1941, and it appears in writing that the Common
wealth's Attorney has had reasonable notice of the time and place
when this report of the testimony and other incidents of the trial
would be tendered and presented to the undersigned for certifi
cation, which is certified within sixty days after final judgment.
Given under my hand this the 20th day of June, 1941.
J. L. ALMOND, JR., Judge,
page 50 ] CERTIFICATE OF CLERK
I, R. J. Watson, Clerk of the Hustings Court for the City
of Roanoke, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing steno
graphic copy or report of testimony and other incidents in the
trial of the case of the City of Roanoke vs. C. A. Assaid alias C.
E. Assaid alias Uric Assaid, was filed with me as Clerk of the
said Court, on the 20th day of June, 1941.
R. J. WATSON, Clerk.
page 51 ] And at another day to-wit; on the 9th day of June,
1941, the following order was entered:
This day came the Attorney for the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and the defendant, C. A. Assaid alias C. E. Assaid
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alias Uric Assaid, came into Court in obedience to his recogniz
ance and plead not guilty to the charge of doing business with
out a license alleged against him in the warrant, and thereupon
with the consent of the Attorney for the Commonwealth the
defendant waived a iury and all matters of law and fact being
submitted to the Court and the Court having heard the evidence
and argument of counsel, it is therefore considered by the Court
that the said C. A. Assaid, alias C. E. Assaid alias Uric .^^said
be fined the sum of $50.00 and it is ordered that the City of
Roanoke, Virginia, do have and recover of the defendant the
said sum of $50.00 fine and all bf its costs in this behalf ex
pended.
Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the Court to
reconsider and set aside its judgment on the grounds that the
ordinance under which the defendant was tried was invalid,
which motion the Court overruled, to which action of the Court
and judgment of the Court in sustaining the validity of the or
dinance and in imposing a sentence of $50.00 and costs against
the defendant, the defendant excepted upon the ground that
the ordinance is void insofar as it give the City Manager arbitrary
power to grant city license to State licenses and to deny them to
others, that it is beyond the authority of the Council to delegate
such authority, and that the arbitrary authority of the City
Manager has been arbitrarily exercised and the defendant fur
ther moved the Court for the same reason to set aside and va
cate such judgment for fine and costs which mo-
page 52 ] tion the Court overruled and the defendant again
excepted for the same reasons, and the defendant
signifying his intention to apply to the Supreme Court of Ap
peals of the State of Virginia for a writ of error and supersedeas
to the judgment of this Court, execution on the above judgment
is suspended upon the defendant executing a bond in the penalty
of $1,000.00, with good security and conditioned according to
law.
page 53 ] CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
State of Virginia
City of Roanoke;
I, R. J. WATSON, Clerk of the Hustings Court of the
City of Roanoke, Virginia, do hereby certify that the for^oi^
is a true and correct transcnpt of the record in the case or Ci 1
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OF ROANOKE, against C. A. ASSAID, alias C. E. ASSAID.
alias URIC ASSAID, lately determined by said Court.
I further certify that notice of the application for this trans
cript has been duly given to the Attorney for the Common
wealth of Virginia, for the City of Roanoke, as provided by
law.
Given under my hand this the 17th day of July, 1941.
R. J. WATSON, Clerk.
A Copy Teste:
J. M. KELLY
Deputy Clerk
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